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Beneficial Ownership Under Section 16
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Janet Gamer Feldman and Richard L. Teberg*
The concept of beneficial ownership under the federal securities laws
has traditionally been thought to include only the equitable ownership in-
terests in securities. Authors Feldman and Teberg suggest that the appli-
cation of traditional concepts of property ownership to the securities field
does little to prevent the breach of fiduciary obligation at which section 16
and other sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are aimed. In-
stead, they suggest the application of two new tests of beneficial owner-
ship: one to determine which securities must be reported by a person once
he is subject to section 16(a); the other to determine which securities are
beneficially owned so as to constitute a person a section 16(a) insider.
After setting forth these new tests, the authors apply them to securities
held by family members, by non-relatives, by partnerships, by corpora-
tions, and in trust. Finally, the authors consider whether options, war-
rants, and other rights in securities can be considered beneficial ownership
for purposes of section 16 of the Exchange Act.
HO IS A "beneficial owner" of securities? Is a person the
30beneficial owner" of securities held by his spouse? Does a
partner "beneficially own" any or all the securities held by his part-
nership? Who is the "beneficial owner" of securities held in a trust
THE AUTHoRs: JANET GAMER FELD-
MAN (B.A., Smith College, LL.B., New
York University) is an attorney with the
Corporation Finance Division of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission in
Washington, D. C.; WRICHARD L. TE-
BERG (A.B., State University of Iowa,
LL.B., George Washington University)
is an attorney on the Executive Staff of
the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion in Washington, D. C.
or by a corporation? Does a
"change in beneficial owner-
ship" include both qualitative
and quantitative changes? May
the same securities be "bene-
ficially owned" by more than
one person? Does the holder
of an unexercised option "bene-
ficially own" the underlying
securities?
The resolution of these and
other questions is necessary to
comply with the various provisions of the rules and forms adopted
under the federal securities acts' which require disclosures of bene-
* This article carries an authorship date of July 1, 1966. The Securities and Ex-
change Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private pub-
lication by any of its members or employees. The views expressed herein are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or its staff.
1 The federal securities acts administered by the SEC are: Securities Act of 1933,
48 Star. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §5 77a-aa (1964) [hereinafter cited as Securities
Act]; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Star. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to
hh-1 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act]; Public Utility Holding Company Act
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ficial ownership,2 and to establish the applicability of other statutory
duties, prohibitions, and liabilities which turn on the existence
of beneficial ownership.' Nowhere is the resolution of questions
concerning beneficial ownership more important than in the opera-
tion of section 16(a) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act)," for that section is concerned solely with obtain-
ing disclosures of beneficial ownership. Moreover, beneficial own-
ership determines who is subject to the section.5
of 1935, 49 Star. 838, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §5 79 to 79z-6 (1964); Trust Indenture
Act of 1939, 53 Star. 1149, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-bbbb (1964); Investment
Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5§ 80a-1 to -52 (1964);
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 54 Star. 847, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 55 80b-1 to -21
(1964).
2 Discosure of the amounts of a security a person beneficially owns is required in
registration statements filed under the Securities Act by paragraph (6) of Schedule A,
and is called for in other registration forms adopted by the SEC under other of the
acts. See, e.g., Item 11, SEC Exchange Act Form 10; Item 15, SEC Public Utility Hold-
ing Company Act Form U5B; Item 14(b) SEC Investment Company Act Form
N-8B-1. Beneficial ownership also must be disclosed in annual reports. See, e.g., Items
5 and 6, SEC Exchange Act Form 10-K; Item 8, SEC Public Utility Holding Company
Act Form U5S; Item 1.109(b), SEC Investment Company Act Form N-1R. It must
also be disclosed in proxy statements (see Items 5 and 6, SEC Exchange Act Schedule
14A), in applications for registration as a broker-dealer (see Item 3 (c) SEC Exchange
Act Form BD), or as an investment adviser (see Item 3 (c) of SEC Investment Advisers
Act Form ADV).
3 Statements of eligibility and qualifications to act as an indenture trustee (see Item
6 of SEC Trust Indenture Act Form T-1 and Item 4 of SEC Trust Indenture Act Form
T-2) require disclosure of beneficial ownership to determine whether a person is "dis-
interested" within the meaning of subsections (5), (6), (7), and (8), of § 310(b) of
the Trust Indenture Act, added by 53 Stat. 1157 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77iji (1964).
A person who does not meet the statutory standards of a "disinterested person" may
not act as an indenture trustee. Beneficial ownership also determines who is an "affili-
ated person" under § 2 (a) (3) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 790,
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2 (a) (3) (1964), and thus determines whether a person
may hold certain positions with, borrow from, or engage in certain transactions with,
an investment company. See, e.g., §§ 9, 10, 17, 21 of the Investment Company Act
of 1940, 54 Stat. 805, 806, 815, 822, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80(a)-9, -10, -17,
-21 (1964).
448 Stat. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1964).
5 The provisions of § 16 of the Exchange Act are substantially duplicated in § 17
of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 830, as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 79q (1964). Section 17, however, is both broader and narrower than 5 16
of the Exchange Act. It does not apply to beneficial owners of more than 10% of
a class of securities, but it does apply to the transactions of any officer or director of
a registered public utility holding company in any securities of the holding company
without limitation to equity securities. Section 30(f) of the Investment Company Act
of 1940, 54 Star. 836, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(f) (1964), incorporates by
reference the provisions of § 16 of the Exchange Act with respect to any securities
(other than short-term paper) issued by a registered dosed-end investment company.
Section 30(f) also applies to any member of an advisory board, investment adviser,
or affiliated person of an investment adviser as well as any beneficial owner of more
than 10% of any class of securities (other than short-term paper) issued by a closed-
end investment company or officer or director of such a company. By virtue of SEC
Public Utility Holding Company Act Rule 72, 17 C.F.R. § 250.72 (rev. ed. 1964),
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I. THE MEANING OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
UNDER THE EXCHANGE ACT
Section 16(a) applies to three separate classes of persons, com-
monly referred to as "insiders": Every person who is (1) directly
or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than ten per cent of
any class7 of equity security' which is registered pursuant to section
12 of the Exchange Act;9 (2) an officer;1" or (3) a director" of
and SEC Investment Company Act Rule 30f-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.30f-1 (rev. ed. 1964),
the rules under § 16(a) of the Exchange Act are made applicable to persons filing
reports under § 17 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act or § 30(f) of the In-
vestment Company Act.
6 In calculating the percentage of ownership of a class of securities under Exchange
Act § 16(a) (other than voting trust certificates or certificates of deposit for an equity
security), the class is deemed to consist of the total amount of the class outstanding,
exclusive of any securities held by or for the account of the issuer. Voting trust certifi-
cates or certificates of deposit are deemed to consist of the total amount of the class of
outstanding securities which can be deposited under the voting trust or deposit agree-
ment. A person acting in good faith can rely on the latest information on file with
the Commission as to the amounts of a class outstanding. See SEC Exchange Act Rule
16a-2, 17 C.F.R. § 24 0.16a-2 (1964).
7 The term "class" is not defined for the purpose of § 16 of the Exchange Act, al-
though it is defined for the purpose of Exchange Act § 12 (g), as added, 78 Stat. 565,
15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1964) and § 15(d), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(d) (1964), to mean "all securities of an issuer which are of substantially similar
character and the holders of which enjoy substantially similar rights and privileges."
In Ellerin v. Massachusetts, 270 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1959), the only case under the
federal securities acts involving the definition of class, the court took the position that
the defendant was not a holder of more than 10% of an issuer's preferred stock for
the purpose of § 16(b). The preferred stock was issued in two series. The defendant
owned more than 10% of one series but less than 10% of both series. Each series
had the same par value, voting rights, and preferences with respect to dividends and
liquidation. They differed in their issuance dates, dividend rates, redemption prices,
and sinking fund arrangements. Finding that the differences in the two series resulted
from conditions in the market at the time of issuance, the court held both series were
part of a single class, as is recognized by the corporation codes of many states.
8 The term "equity security" is defined in SEC Exchange Act Rule 3a11-1, 17 C.F.R.
240.3a11-1 (Supp. 1966), to include a broad range of equity interests and, like Ex-
change Act § 3(a)(11), 48 Star. 884 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (1964),
includes any security convertible, with or without consideration, into such security, or
carrying any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase such a security; or any such
warrant or right.
948 Stat. 892 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1964). Subsection (a)
of § 12 prohibits trading in a security on a national securities exchange unless the
security is registered for listing on the exchange, or an exemption is available. Sub-
section (g) of § 12 requires every issuer with total assets of more than one million
dollars to register each class of its non-exempt equity securities held of record by 750
or more persons at the end of its fiscal year. After July 1, 1966 such issuers will be
required to register each such class held of record by 500 or more persons. Section
12 (g) was added to the Exchange Act by the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964,
Pub. L No. 467, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 20, 1964). For an excellent discussion
of these amendments see Phillips & Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amend-
nents of 1964, 1964 DuKE LJ. 706.
10The term "officer" is defined in SEC Exchange Act Rule 3b-2, 17 C.F.R. 5
240.3b-2 (rev. ed. 1964), to mean "a president, vice president, treasurer, secretary,
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the issuer of such a security. After registration" of a class of equity
security, or within ten days after a person becomes such a beneficial
owner, officer, or director, he is required to file with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (Commission)' 3 an initial statement 4
which discloses "the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of
which he is the beneficial owner.... .""1 Thereafter, if there has
been a change in such ownership the section requires him to file,
within ten days after the close of each calendar month in which a
change has occurred, a statement 6 "indicating his ownership at the
close of the calendar month and such changes in his ownership as
occurred during such calendar month."1" Section 16(a) thus sets
up a system under which the beneficial ownership of the insider in
the securities of his issuer must be disclosed continuously.
Notwithstanding the fact that beneficial ownership is signifi-
cant to the successful operation of various provisions of the securi-
ties acts, and is of crucial importance to section 16(a), there is no
general definition of the term in the acts.' Hence, the meaning
comptroller, and any other person who performs for an issuer, whether incorporated or
unincorporated, functions corresponding to those performed by the foregoing officers."
Cf. Colby v. Kune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949), reversing and remanding 83 F.
Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282
(S.D. Cal. 1953); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal.
1952); 2 Loss, SECUmRTI Es REGULATION 1091-94 (2d ed. 1961).
11Defined in Exchange Act § 3(a) (7), 48 Stat. 883 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)
(7) (1964), to mean "any director of a corporation or any person performing similar
functions with respect to any organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated."
This definition presumably covers a trustee of a business trust or a member of a com-
mittee which issues certificates of deposit.
12The SEC does not require persons to file their first report under § 16(a) until
ten days after registration under § 12 is effective. See Instruction 2 to SEC Exchange
Act Form 3.
13 If the issuer has a security registered for listing on a national stock exchange, a
copy of the report must also be filed with the stock exchange. If the issuer has secu-
rities listed on more than one exchange, it may designate a single exchange to receive
copies of the reports under SEC Exchange Act Rule 16a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1 (c)
(rev. ed. 1964).
14 The iital statement of beneficial ownership must be filed on SEC Exchange Act
Form 3. No additional report on Form 3 is required by a person filing under § 16
because another class of the issuer's securities is registered or the person assumes another
or an additional relationship to the issuer which would subject him to § 16. See SEC
Exchange Act Rule 16a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1 (b) (Supp. 1966).
15 Exchange Act § 16, 48 Star. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)
(1964).
'
6 Statements of changes in beneficial ownership must be filed on SEC Exchange
Act Form 4. See SEC Exchange Act Rule 16a-1, 17 C.F.R. §240.16a-1 (Supp. 1966).
17 Exchange Act § 16(a), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)
(1964).
18 Section 3(c) (1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 797, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (c) (1) (1964), contains a special definition for computing
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must be drawn from the words themselves, and interpreted in a
manner which accords with the purposes of the section, and the
place of the section within the scheme of the Exchange Act."
What do the words "beneficial owner" mean? If "owner" were
used alone, it doubtless would be regarded as referring to a legal or
equitable owner. The legislative history of section 16(a), however,
makes clear that the term "beneficial owner" was intended to ex-
clude a person having bare legal title only.2" The word "bene-
ficial" means "tending to the benefit of a person; yielding a profit,
advantage or benefit."'" Does the use of "beneficial" and "owner"
together mean that a beneficial owner is one who must have a
claim enforceable in equity, to those aspects of ownership which
yield profit, advantage, or benefit? Or rather, is the term "bene-
ficial" used to describe the benefits which equitable ownership
traditionally confers, so that a beneficial owner is a person who does
enjoy such benefits, irrespective of any enforceable rights thereto?
Presumably, it is the latter, for if the presence of an enforceable
ownership right to such benefits is made a prerequisite to beneficial
ownership, what results is equitable ownership. Undoubtedly, if
Congress had meant equitable ownership, it would have said so.22
The legislative history and the purposes of the section indicate
the number of beneficial owners. "For the purpose of this paragraph, beneficial owner-
ship by a company shall be deemed to be beneficial ownership by one person; except
that, if such company owns 10 per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities
of the issuer, the beneficial ownership shall be deemed to be that of the holders of
such company's outstanding securities .. " Ibid. This definition is of no assistance
in determining the amount of securities a person beneficially owns.
'9 As the court noted in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51
(1943) : "However well... [rules of statutory interpretation] may serve at times to aid
in deciphering legislative intent, they long have been subordinated to the doctrine that
courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general pur-
pose, will read text in the light of context and will interpret the text so far as the mean-
ing of the words fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally ex-
pressed legislative policy." See also COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF THE
CONFLICTS OF LAWS 154-93 (1942). Generally speaking, all the securities acts have
as their central theme the protection of shareholders and use a similar format to accom-
plish this purpose. Consequently, an interpretation of the term "beneficial ownership"
under one section can be a guide in determining its meaning elsewhere in the federal
securities acts where it is used in the same context.
20 The initial bills referred to "every director, officer, or owner of securities, own-
ing as of record and/or beneficially more than 5 per centum of any class of securities."
H. R. 7852, S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 15(a) (1934). See also SEC Exchange
Act Release No. 4718, June 18, 1952.
21BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY 198 (4th ed. 1951).
2 2 During the hearings on the Exchange Act Senator Carey asked, "Is 'beneficial
owner' the proper term there?" Mr. Corcoran, one of the drafters of the Exchange Act
responded, "It is the broadest term you can have." Hearings Before the Senate Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6556 (1934).
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that when Congress used the term "beneficial owner" it intended
to include not only an equitable owner, but also a person who
actually obtains or enjoys the benefits of security ownership, even
though he has no enforceable rights thereto.
The position that it is the benefits of, rather than the rights to,
ownership which are the essence of beneficial ownership was first
embraced by the Commission in 193523 and reaffirmed this year:'
A person ... may be regarded as the beneficial owner of secur-
ities held in the name of another person, if by reason of any con-
tract, understanding, relationship, agreement, or other arrangement,
he obtains therefrom benefits substantially equivalent to those of
ownership.25
What then are the benefits conferred by ownership of a security?
Ownership of a security, as with any property, normally involves a
bundle of rights, duties, powers, and liabilities. But the term
"beneficial ownership" is concerned with only the salutary or ad-
vantageous, rather than the burdensome, aspects of security owner-
ship. The beneficial incidents of security ownership seem to fall
into two categories: (1) those which are intrinsic to the security,
such as dividends on stock, interest on debentures, and the right
to vote; and (2) those which arise from dealing and speculating
with the security, such as buying and selling.
Two factors enhance the benefits of security ownership in a man-
ner disproportionate to the number of securities owned: (1) own-
ership of large amounts of a security and (2) control of the cor-
poration. Merely by reason of the volume of his purchases and
sales, the owner of large amounts of a security is able to drive the
23 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 175, April 16, 1934, stated: 'Whether or not
the husband is the beneficial owner of such securities depends upon whether by reason
of any contract, understanding, relationship, agreement or other arrangement he has
benefits substantially equivalent to those of ownership."
24 SEC Exchange Release No. 7793 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 26031 (Jan. 19,
1966). After Release No. 7793 was published, the staff of the Commission received
numerous questions about whether the Commission intended to require persons to
amend reports and forms previously filed with the Commission. The Commission
then republished the release as SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7824, 2 CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 5 26030 (Feb. 14, 1966), adding that the opinions expressed in the release
were not intended to be applied retroactively; that the Commission did not intend to
require the filing of amended reports or forms; that it would be sufficient if persons
complied with the disclosure requirements of the release by May 1, 1966; and empha-
sized that its opinions were directed to the information contained in the reports and
forms filed with it, and were not intended as expressions of opinion on questions aris-
ing under the profit recovery provisions of § 16 (b).
2 5 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7824, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 26030 at
19057-5 (Feb. 14, 1966). (Emphasis added.)
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market price up or down.26 By thus manipulating the market he
may create and take advantage of profitable market opportunities.
These possibilities are further enhanced when the holder of a secu-
rity owns a sufficient number of shares to obtain control of the cor-
poration by voting them. For control not only increases the price
obtainable for the control block of securities27 but also confers on
the holder the ability to govern the timing and happening of cor-
porate events which affect the market price of the company's se-
curities, as well as the timing of the release of news of these events.
The advantages of control also accrue to persons holding cer-
tain positions with the company. Thus, persons who control or
influence the control of a corporation, either by virtue of office or
security ownership, by reason of their superior knowledge of factors
affecting the market, are able to secure for themselves market bene-
fits not available to other security holders by regulating the flow
of corporate news." The ability to influence control and to obtain in-
side information, which reposes in owners of a large block of a securi-
ty, officers, and directors, was found by the Congress to have been
used to carry out a variety of practices inimical to the maintenance
of a fair and orderly securities market."
In view of the evidence developed during the investigations
that preceded the enactment of the Exchange Act that these prac-
tices had contributed to the uncontrolled speculation which had
been an important cause of the credit inflation leading to the eco-
2 6 While ownership of a large amount of securities is not a necessary concommitant
to marker manipulation, the holder of a large amount of securities is in a better position
to successfully carry out a manipulation.
27 Cf. Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955).
28 "Even a noncontrolling 'insider' has the power to misuse inside information for
speculative purposes by trading in light of the inside information to which he is privy.
A 'controlling insider' also can manipulate corporate activity in order to create favor-
able short-swing trading situations." Blan v. Lamb, Civil No. 29940, 2d Cir., June 27,
1966.
29 The reason for including beneficial owners of more than 10% of a class of
registered equity security in addition to officers and directors of an issuer was explained
as follows:
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the sub-
committee was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and
officers of corporations who used their positions of trust and the confidential
information which came to them in such positions to aid them in their market
activities. Closely allied to this type of abuse was the unscrupulous employ-
ment of inside information by large stockholders who, while not directors and
officers, exercised sufficient control over the destinies of their companies to
enable them to acquire and profit by information not available to others.
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, Stock Exchange Practices, S. REP.
No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6556 (1934).
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nomic collapse of 1929 and the subsequent depression,"° the Con-
gress sought to reach the causes of "unnecessary, unwise and de-
structive speculation."'" This was done by controlling credit; 2 by
prohibiting pool operations," manipulations, and similar deceptive
devices; 4 by regulating the relationship of the investing public to
listed companies through various disclosure requirements; 5 and by
extending the legal concept of fiduciary obligations to corporate
management. 6  The evils inherent in speculation, manipulation,
faulty credit control, investors' ignorance, and abuse of relationships
of trust were regarded by the Congress as "a seamless web," no one
of which could be isolated for cure from the others. 7
Section 16(a) was an integral part of the scheme to control
speculation and market manipulation" and to establish the proposi-
tion that managers of companies have fiduciary responsibilities to
their shareholders. 9 The Congressional intent underlying section
30 S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
311-. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1934).
3 2 Exchange Act §§ 7, 8, 48 Star. 886, 888 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78g,
78h (1964).
33Exchange Act § 9, 48 Star. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1964).
3 4 Exchange Act § 10, 15(c), 48 Star. 891, 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
55 78j, 78o(c) (1964).
35 Exchange Act §§ 12-16, 48 Star. 892, 894-96 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
55 787-78p (1964).
SOExchange Act § 16, 48 Stat. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1964).
37 See H. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
38 Exchange Act § 16(a), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)
(1964). While the abuse of inside information by insiders was reprehensible in itself,
the Congress also saw § 16 as a device for preventing manipulation of the market. See,
H. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934); S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
55-68 (1934). The integral nature of § 16 to the operation of the Exchange Act is
also apparent from a reading of § 2 of the act which begins:
For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions in securities as com-
monly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are
affected with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide
for regulation and control of such transactions and of practices and matters
related thereto, including transactions by officers, directors, and principal se-
curity holders, to require appropriate reports, and to impose requirements nec-
essary to make such regulation and control reasonably complete and effective,
in order to protect interstate commerce, the national credit, the Federal taxing
power, to protect and make more effective the national banking system and
Federal Reserve System, and to insure the maintenance of fair and honest
markets in such transactions .... Exchange Act § 2, 48 Stat. 881 (1934),
15 U.S.C. § 78b (1964).
39 Prior to 1934 corporate insiders were relatively free to trade in their company's
securities. Most courts did not apply a standard of fiduciary relationship between them
and the company's security holders in these transactions. See Cook & Feldman, Insider
Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 385, 408-09 (1953).
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16(a) is dear: "Men charged with the administration of other
people's money must not use inside information for their own ad-
vantage."4
The House thought that subjecting insiders to the continuous
reporting requirements of section 16 (a) and prohibiting these per-
sons from making short sales and "sales against the box"' would,
in conjunction with the other provisions of the Exchange Act, vir-
tually eliminate unsavory insider abuses of trust and manipula-
tions. The deterrent provided by the full and prompt publicity
of section 16(a) is described in the House Report as "the most po-
tent weapon against the abuse of inside information."43  The Sen-
ate added section 16(b)44 as an aid to effecting this general goal in
one specific area of harm based upon inside position - short-term
trading based upon and made profitable by the unfair use of inside
information. Section 16(b) provides that any profits realized by
an insider from the purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, within
less than six months, of equity securities of his issuer, inure to, and
are recoverable by, the issuer.45
The importance of establishing this fiduciary relationship was stated in the House Re-
port:
If investor confidence is to come back to the benefit of exchanges and cor-
porations alike, the law must advance. As a complex society so diffuses and
differentiates the financial interests of the ordinary citizen that he has to trust
others and cannot personally watch the managers of all his interests as one
horse trader watches another, it becomes a condition of the very stability of
that society that its rules of law and of business practice recognize and protect
that ordinary citizen's dependent position. Unless constant extension of the
legal conception of a fiduciary relationship - a guarantee of "straight shoot-
ing" - supports the constant extension of mutual confidence which is the
foundation of a maturing and complicated economic system, easy liquidity of
the resources in which wealth is invested is a danger rather than a prop to the
stability of that system. H. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934).
40H. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934).
41 A short sale is accomplished by selling securities which the seller does not own.
Securities are borrowed for sale with the expectation that the price of the security will
decline and a profit made by repaying the borrowed securities with securities acquired
at the lower price. A "sale against the box" is a sale by a person having sufficient
securities to cover the sale but who, instead, borrows securities for delivery after sale.
It is a form of hedge transaction. These transactions are prohibited to insiders by
§ 16(c).
42 H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), adopted by the House and subsequently
amended by the Senate did not contain the profit recovery provisions which now appear
in § 16(b) of the Exchange Act.
4 3 H. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934).
4 4 Exchange Act § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p
(1964).
45 It is no defense to the profit recovery provisions of § 16(b) to show that there
was no actual abuse of inside information. This is conclusively presumed from the
occurrence of a purchase and sale within less than six months of each other. If the
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The juxtaposition of section 16(a) and 16(b), plus the fact
that both operate with respect to the same persons, has led many to
erroneously conclude that section 16 (a) was enacted only to reveal
transactions within the scope of section 16(b). That section 16(a)
is not confined to transactions within the scope of section 16(b) is
dear not only from the fact that section 16(a) pre-existed section
16(b) ," but also from the different language of the two sub-
sections. For while section 16(b) speaks of purchases and sales
within six months of each other, section 16(a) speaks of changes
in beneficial ownership, a much broader concept." True, transac-
tions which are the subject of section 16(b) are revealed by the
reports required under section 16(a), but section 16(b) is only
one of the provisions of the Exchange Act the violation of which
section 16(a) was designed to expose. In addition, manipulations
and other abuses of inside position - the respective subjects of
sections 9 and 10 of the Exchange Act48 - also are disclosed by the
section 16(a) reports.
Section 9, which is addressed to "any person," is aimed at pre-
venting pool operations and manipulations. In this section, Con-
gress prohibited various transactions made for the purpose of creat-
ing a false or misleading appearance of active trading in any security
registered on a national securities exchange; transactions in which
there is no change in beneficial ownership of a security - so called
wash sales; the entry of purchase (sale) orders with the knowledge
that sale (purchase) orders for substantially the same amount of
securities are being entered at substantially the same time - so
called matched orders; the making of false or misleading state-
ments about either the security itself, or the markets for such secu-
rity; and any other transactions designed to drive the price up or
down for the purpose of inducing others to buy or sell. Section 9
person from whom the insider bought or sold can show an actual abuse of inside in-
formation, however, that person can also recover his damages from the insider under
section 10(b). The provisions of § 16(b) have been the subject of numerous articles
by legal scholars. See generally 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 10, at 1037-132; Cook &
Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act (pts. 1-2), 66 HARV.
L. REV. 385, 612 (1953); Painter, The Evolving Role of § 16(b), 62 MIcH. L REv.
649 (1964).
46 See note 43 supra.
47 Quite obviously not all changes in benefidal ownership, which include changes
from direct to indirect beneficial ownership, or vice versa, give rise to profits recover-
able under § 16(b). The Commission has provided, however, in SEC Exchange Act
Rule 16a-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-10 (rev. ed. 1964), that any transactions which it
exempts from the reporting requirements of § 16(a) are also exempt from the pro-
visions of § 16(b).
4848 Star. 889, 891 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j (1964).
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also provides a cause of action for damages in favor of persons in-
jured by any of the prohibited acts or practices.4 9
Congress gave to the Commission in section 10 the authority
to adopt rules prohibiting "any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance" in the purchase or sale of any security by any per-
son. The Commission has adopted a number of rules under the
section, the best known of which is SEC Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 0
which makes unlawful a variety of fraudulent 'and manipulative
practices in the purchase or sale of securities. Thus, the purchase
and sale of securities with more than six months intervening, and
a single purchase or sale of securities involving the misuse of inside
position, are covered by section 10 and Rule 10b-5 although not
included within the narrow provisions of section 16(b).
Since the terms of section 16 (a) require insiders to disclose any
changes in their beneficial ownership of securities, it provides a
means for bringing to light possible violations of section 9 and
Rule lOb-5, as well as a "purchase and sale" within the scope of
section 16(b). However, two other functions of the section 16(a)
reports are equally important to the efficacious operations of the
Exchange Act's scheme to banish investors' ignorance and upgrade
the ethics of corporate managers. Its second function is to reveal
information which may be used in evaluating the securities of the
issuer.5 This is a pure disclosure device in which the conclusions
to be drawn from the reports and the weight to be attached thereto
are left to the judgment of the individual investor. The information
contained in the reports may be used (1) as a guide to the insiders'
current confidence or lack thereof in the company's fortunes or (2)
to detect an evolving change in control in the company.5" Un-
49 For an extensive discussion of manipulation see 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 10,
at 1529-70. See also S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 30-66 (1934).
50 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (rev. ed. 1964). For an extensive discussion of Rule
10b-5 see, e.g., Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV.
1146 (1965); Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Fed-
eral Corporation Law Under Rule 1~b-5, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1361 (1965).
51 The House Committee explained: "This [disclosure) is to give investors an idea
of the purchases and sales by insiders which may, in turn, indicate their private opinion
as to the prospects of the Company." H. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 24
(1934). See also Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,
73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6556 (1934).
52 See Chicago So. Shore & So. Bend R.R. v. Monon R.R., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
5 91525 (N.D. I1. 1965). Two substantially identical bills now pending before the
Congress seek to require public disclosure of the name, background security holdings,
and other information about persons before they acquire more than 5 % of a class of
registered equity security. The bills, S. 2731 introduced by Senator Williams of New
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doubtedly this investment information function of the section largely
explains why the Commission's monthly summary of transactions
reported under section 16(a) has become a perennial best seller.5"
Finally, section 16(a) is itself a deterrent to the misuse of inside
information through the publicity which attaches to the reports,54
apart from any other statutory prohibition or liability. This is a
standard by-product or goal of any disclosure provision, since pre-
sumably people are likely to refrain from improper acts, or acts
which may appear improper, if they know such acts will be exposed
to public scrutiny.55
Thus, if section 16(a) is to achieve its goals, "beneficial owner-
ship" must be construed "not technically and restrictively, but flexi-
bly to effectuate... [its] broad remedial purposes."5  Such a con-
struction leads to the conclusion that it is the enjoyment of the
benefits of security ownership, rather than the rights to such bene-
fits, which is the appropriate standard for construing the term "bene-
ficial ownership" as used in section 16(a). Accordingly, in com-
puting whether a person is subject to the section as the beneficial
owner of more than ten per cent of a class of registered equity secu-
rity, the purposes of section 16(a) require the inclusion of any
securities from which he obtains those benefits of ownership
which enable him to achieve an inside position. And, to fully effectu-
ate the purposes of section 16 (a), once a person is subject
to it, either by reason of beneficial ownership or position as officer
or director, he should also be regarded as beneficially owning any
securities from which he obtains benefits of ownership which may
Jersey, and H.R.14417 introduced by Congressman Staggers, would amend §§ 10 and
16 of the Exchange Act. For a discussion of the bills and the SEC's comments on
them, see Address by SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen before the American Society
of Corporate Secretaries, June 28, 1966.
N3 At the end of 1965, approximately 26,000 persons subscribed to the "Official
Summary of Securities Transactions and Holdings," which lists changes in beneficial
ownership reported to the Commission. This monthly publication can be ordered, for
a nominal charge, from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office,
Washington, D. C. 20402.
54 The House Committee explained: "It is hoped ... that the publicity features of
the bill will tend to bring these practices into disrepute and encourage the voluntary
maintenance of proper fiduciary standards by those in control of large corporate enter-
prises .... " H. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934).
55 In a sense, disclosure under § 16(a) is designed to reach those "wrongs" which
cannot practicably be outlawed. Instead, publicity exposes insider's transactions to the
ethical and moral sanctions of Society - the 'Law beyond the Law" - discussed by
Chief Justice Earl Warren in an address at the Louis Marshall Award Dinner of The
Jewish Theological Seminary of America, November 11, 1962.
56 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
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provide either the incentive for, or lend themselves to, any of the
abuses of inside position that the Exchange Act was designed to
prevent.
The remainder of this Article will consider the specific situa-
tions giving rise to questions concerning beneficial ownership for
purposes of section 16(a). The bulk of these problems arise from
either of two factual circumstances: The first is where the securi-
ties are held of record by a person other than the insider; the second
is where the insider himself is the record owner. The resolution
of who is the beneficial owner of the securities in these cases re-
quires an analysis of what benefits a person receives from securities,
how these benefits are obtained, and the extent to which the receipt
of such benefits brings the securities within the letter and spirit
of the section.
II. BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF SECURITIES
HELD BY FAMILY MEMBERS
The Commission recently published an interpretative release"
setting forth the general test for determining beneficial ownership
of securities held of record by another person:
A person ... may be regarded as the beneficial owner of secu-
rities held in the name of another person, if by reason of any con-
tract, understanding, relationship, agreement, or other arrangement,
he obtains therefrom benefits substantially equivalent to those of
ownership. Accordingly, where such benefits are present such se-
curities should be reported as being benefically owned by the re-
porting person.58
The release was principally concerned with identifying the benefits
of ownership arising out of the family relationship. On the specific
question of securities held by a person's wife and minor children
the release stated:
Generally a person is regarded as the beneficial owner of securi-
ties held in the name of his or her spouse and their minor children.
Absent special circumstances such relationship ordinarily results in
such person obtaining benefits substantially equivalent to those of
ownership, e.g., application of the income derived from such secur-
ities to maintain a common home, to meet expenses which such
person otherwise would meet from other sources, or the ability to
5 7 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7824, 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 26030 (Feb.
14, 1966), which was a republication of SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7793, 2 CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 26031 (Jan. 19, 1966), which contained certain typographical er-




exercise a controlling influence over the purchase, sale, or voting of
such securities. Accordingly, a person ordinarily should include in
his reports filed pursuant to Section 16(a) securities held in the
name of a spouse or minor children as being beneficially owned
by himP9
Where securities are held by family members other than a
spouse or minor child, the Commission, immediately after setting
forth the general test, said:
[T]he fact that the person is a relative or relative of a spouse and
sharing the same home as the reporting person may in itself indi-
cate that the reporting person would obtain benefits substantially
equivalent to those of ownership from securities held in the name
of such relative. Thus, absent countervailing facts, it is expected
that securities held by relatives who share the same home as the re-
porting person will be reported as being beneficially owned by such
person. 60
Clearly, the Commission's position concerning an insider's sec-
tion 16(a) beneficial ownership of securities held by his spouse and
minor children, is necessary if the section is to be given meaning in
this context. The practice of placing property in the name of a
spouse is a time-honored method of evading a variety of legal obli-
gations. The release, however, is not directed solely towards such
obtuse and highly unoriginal maneuvers, which obviously must be
defeated if the section is not to become a complete mockery, but also
it recognizes and reaches the more subtle, but equally important
community of interest which normally exists among family mem-
bers with respect to property management."' The existence of such
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Thus, the Release touches upon the practice of insiders in giving advance informa-
tion to their families. The necessity of curtailing the practice of insiders' releasing news
to a favored few, in advance of the public, was recognized by the Congress and the
drafters of the Exchange Act. The original draft of the act dealt with the "tip" prob-
lem by a provision which probited an insider from either using or giving information.
S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 15 (b) (3) (1934). Although the provision was not en-
acted, Congress made clear that no implication should be drawn from the omission that
it was no longer concerned with the giving of inside information. Indeed, when the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce reported out H.R. 9323, which
omitted the "tip" provision, it explained:
The bill legislates specifically just as far as the Committee feels it can. The
original bill submitted to the Committee dealt very specifically and definitely
with a number of admitted abuses. In many cases, however, the argument
was made that while the solutions offered might be correct, their effects were
so far-reaching as to make it inadvisable to put these solutions in the form of
statutory enactments that could not be changed in case of need without Con-
gressional action. Representatives of the stock exchanges constantly urged
a greater degree of flexibility in the statute and insisted that the complicated
nature of the problems justified leaving much greater latitude of discretion
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community of interest in securities held by family members for
securities acts purposes was treated more fully in the Commission's
opinion in J. P. Morgan & Co., 2 where the following argument
was made to show that securities held by one adult member of the
family are of no pecuniary interest to another adult member of the
family:
To say that this pecuniary interest rests in the 'families' of these
Directors has no significance whatever. These families consist of
several separate independent adult individuals, - all of them 'free,
white and twenty one' - and those persons who now own Pre-
ferred Stock of Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated have the out-
right, unfettered, unconditional ownership of that stock. Their
pecuniary interest is their own. It is not the pecuniary interest of
any other member of the family in any instance.63
The Commission responded to this argument saying:
It is true, of course, that the holders of the underwriter's preferred
stock are of full age and, we assume, are not dominated against
their own interests by members of their families who are directors
and officers of the trust company. But is it true that their pecu-
niary interests are not those of any other members of their fam-
ilies? For example, it will be noted that the wife of Thomas W.
Lamont has an investment of $250,000 in the preferred stock of
the underwriter, currently yielding dividends of $10,000 per year.
Is this of no pecuniary interest to her husband? Possibly not, but
it may be presumed to be, at least in the absence of special circum-
stances not shown here. So also with the investments in preferred
stock held by wives of other directors of the trust company.
For another example, nearly $200,000 par value of the stock
yielding nearly $8,000 per year is held by Leffingwell's daughter.
with the administrative agencies than would otherwise be the case. It is for
that reason that the bill in dealing with a number of difficult problems singles
out these problems as matters appropriate to be subject to restrictive rules and
regulations, but leaves to the administrative agencies the determination of the
most appropriate form of rule or regulation to be enforced. In a field where
practices constantly vary and where practices legitimate for some purposes may
be turned to illegitimate and fraudulent means, broad discretionary powers in
the administrative agency have been found practically essential, despite the
desire of the Committee to limit the discretion of the administrative agencies
so far as compatible with workable legislation.... H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1934).
And when the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency reported out S. 3420, in
which the same omission had been made, it discussed the abuse of inside information
under the general heading of "Manipulative Practices," - the subject of § 10(b). S.
REP. No. 192, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1934). Since 5 16(a) speaks in terms of
"direct or indirect" beneficial ownership, it seems clear that the section is broad enough
to reach the recognized abuse of tipping where the insider either trades through another
person or splits the profits with such person. See Hearing Before the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6558 (1934).
62 10 S.E.C. 119 (1941).
68 ld. at 147. (Emphasis in original.)
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Leffingwell testified that he gave it to her, not only to divest him-
self of its ownership but also in order to capitalize an allowance
he has been giving to her. He further testified that she had four
children and needed the income. It may be true that a man is not
generally responsible for the support of his grown daughter or his
grandchildren, and it may be that if anything occurred to stop the
income on that investment, Leffingwell could wash his hands of the
whole matter and suffer no loss as a matter of law. But to say that
his daughter's interest in that investment is of no pecuniary interest
to him is to ignore realities. That is not the way the minds of hu-
man beings ordinarily function."
Thus in Morgan the Commission recognized the pecuniary bene-
fits which a person obtains from securities held by his family mem-
bers. Two specific examples of pecuniary benefits were described
in the release: First, "the application of the income derived from
such securities to maintain a common home," which would, of
course, be applicable to any relative sharing the same home as the
insider, as well as his spouse and minor child. The second, which
is not confined to relatives sharing the same home, refers to the
financial relief gained by the insider when the income from securi-
ties held by family members is "used to meet expenses which such
person would otherwise meet from other sources." This would
cover both legal obligations, such as support or education, as well
as social or moral obligations of the type shouldered by Leffingwell
in the Morgan case in connection with the securities held by his
adult daughter.65 Presumably, the presence of either of these pecu-
niary benefits which flow from the family relationship itself would
be sufficient to constitute the insider the beneficial owner of securi-
ties held by other family members.
Quite obviously, however, the two pecuniary benefits described
in the release illustrate rather than define the pecuniary interests
which exist among family members, for common financial interests
of families exist irrespective of the precise use of the proceeds of
the family members' securities. The natural love and affection
which produces this community of interest is in no way necessarily
diminished either by the geographical distance between, or individ-
ual wealth, of such persons. Nor is the bond in any way weakened
by the source from which the securities were acquired by another
family member. The incentive and temptation provided by the
family holdings to a person to gain and thereafter to abuse an in-
64 Ibid.
65 If this were meant to cover only legal obligations, presumably the language would
refer to expenses which such person is required to meet.
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side position is manifest. The frequent appearance of family hold-
ings in the descriptions of predatory activities uncovered in the in-
vestigations that preceded the adoption of the Exchange Act pro-
vides striking evidence of the unity of purpose and interest in things
financial and the existence of "the ability to exercise a controlling
influence over the purchase, sale or voting" of securities fostered by
the family relationship. 6 The inclusion of securities held of record
by family members on the basis of such pecuniary benefits alone is
consistent with the aim of Rule lOb-5 to eliminate a variety of
abuses of inside position, including the giving of confidential news
to a favored few before the public. Furthermore, it serves to re-
veal to public investors the full measure of confidence of the insider
in the company.
The application of the benefits test in the context of determin-
ing beneficial ownership of securities held by other family members
requires an examination of each situation. Not all family relation-
ships are the same. It is fairly easy to conclude, for example, that
the purposes of section 16, absent special circumstances such as a
legal separation, require a person to include in his reports under
section 16(a) all securities held by his spouse and minor children
as being beneficially owned by him. It is not so easy, however, to
establish an easy rule of thumb for determining whether securities
held by an adult child, a brother or sister, or more distant relative
should be included. The determination must be based on the rela-
tionship that exists and the opportunities and incentives it offers.
The question is: Does the person obtain the benefits of ownership
from the securities held by a particular relative which may provide
him with either the ability or the incentive to engage in the abuses
of inside position which the Exchange Act was designed to pre-
vent? If they do, they should be included; if not, they need not be
included. Apparently, in recognition of the difficulties in deciding
close questions, the Commission in Release No. 7793 invited per-
sons to write to it on questions of beneficial ownership to obtain
opinions of its staff.
III. BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF SECURITIES
HELD BY NON-RELATIVES
The reaping of pecuniary benefits from securities held by non-
6 6 See, e.g., S. RFP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934). Indeed, a review
of this history is evidence of the truth of a slight variation of the theme "The family
that preys together, stays together."
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relatives would similarly constitute the insider a beneficial owner
irrespective of how these benefits arise. For it is not the route
through which a person acquires the benefits of ownership which
constitutes him the beneficial owner; it is the fact that such benefits
repose in him. Certainly, it cannot be seriously contended that such
benefits, when obtained "by reason of any contract, understanding,
agreement or other arrangement" become any less "benefits sub-
stantially equivalent to ownership" than when obtained by reason
of relationship, familial or otherwise. Although the existence of
such a "contract, understanding, agreement or other arrangement"
is a factual question, the actual reaping of pecuniary benefits, such
as the sharing of trading profits or a guarantee against trading
losses, would provide evidence that such an arrangement or under-
standing exists. Obviously, a person beneficially owns any securi-
ties held for him by a mere nominee.67
The third "benefit" referred to in Release No. 7793 - "the
ability to exercise a controlling influence over the purchase, sale, or
voting of... securities - although a concommitant of the normal
family relationship, is not limited to such relationship. This is ob-
viously a description of three separate benefits of security ownership,
none of which are dependent on the receipt of the pecuniary benefits
of securities ownership. But, would the ability of A to exercise a con-
trolling influence over either the purchase, sale, or voting of securi-
ties held by B require A to count those securities to determine
whether he is subject to section 16 (a) ? A should include those securi-
ties over which he exercises a "controlling influence" to vote,68
for this is the benefit of ownership used to secure the inside posi-
tion upon which rest the various abuses which section 16(a) was
designed to prevent. On the other hand, it is not necessary that A
include those securities where his "controlling influence" extends
only to the buying or selling in reckoning his status as a beneficial
owner of more than ten per cent, for these benefits alone do not
give him an inside position.
Once A achieves a section 16(a) inside position, however,
(either as an officer, director, or through his beneficial ownership
of securities), he should be regarded as the beneficial owner of any
securities, the buying or selling of which he has either a practical or
67 Ci. Equity Corp., 2 S.E.C. 675, 678-80 (1937); General Income Shares, Inc., 1
S.E.C. 110, 114 (1935).
6 8 The test is the ability to exercise a "controlling influence" over the vote; not the
actual voting of shares by a revocable proxy. Of course a person holding an irrevocable
proxy, or a trustee of a voting trust, would enjoy the requisite ability.
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legal ability to control as well as those that he may vote. The in-
clusion of such securities in the insider's section 16(a) reports on
the basis of the buy and sell ability alone is wholly consistent with
those purposes of the section devoted to curtailing and revealing
abuses of inside position and market manipulations, in addition to
those aimed at revealing insider confidence, even though the insider
receives no pecuniary benefits of ownership from the securities in
question.
The only purpose of section 16(a) which might not be opera-
tive by reason of the absence of financial interest in such securities
is disclosure of transactions subject to section 16(b). That is, if
the insider obtained no financial benefit from those securities, he
might not realize profits, susceptible to recapture under section
16(b), from buying and selling them. The inapplicability of sec-
tion 16(b) - which by its terms is limited in scope - does not
mean, however, that there has been no abuse of inside position or
market manipulation in the transactions in such securities which
would be contrary to the terms and intent of either or both section
9 and Rule 1 Ob-5. Nor would the inapplicability of section 16(b)
render the reports of insider transactions in such securities any less
valuable as an aid to shareholders and investors in determining
their own investment policies with respect to the company's securi-
ties.
The charitable organization, whether organized in corporate or
trust form, supplies an excellent illustration. Suppose A is a sec-
tion 16(a) insider by virtue of his position as chairman of the board
of B & Co. He is also a director (or trustee) of the A Family
Foundation, which complies with the tax law provisions so that A
receives no income from the Foundation's activities. The Founda-
tion owns a large block of B & Co.'s securities. If the Foundation
sells all of its B & Co. holdings, is it not possible that it has done so
pursuant to unfavorable news not known to the public concerning
the future of B & Co.? And, even if such sale was not based upon
any provable abuse of inside information, would it not be of in-
terest to shareholders and investors to know of such sale as an in-
dication of insider confidence? Similarly, assume A causes the
Foundation to sell its B & Co. holdings with the result that the
market price declines, and immediately thereafter A buys large
amounts of the same B & Co. security. Has A violated the pro-
hibitions of section 9 or of section 10(b)? Of course, additional
data would be required to make the ultimate determination as to
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whether these transactions run afoul of sections 9 and 10(b). But
how can the existence of such possible violations be detected if the
section 16(a) report reflects only the purchases of A for his in-
dividual account? Unless A, by virtue of his ability to control the
buying and selling of the Foundation's holdings in B & Co., is re-
garded as the beneficial owner of such securities for section 16(a)
purposes, the role that the section 16(a) reports were intended to
play in investing corporate managers with fiduciary standards and
effecting the anti-manipulative design of the act is wholly frustrated.
The point is that an insider's ability to control the buying and sell-
ing of securities of his company supplies him with all that is neces-
sary to manipulate and condition the market for his own ends. By
no stretch of the imagination is this market advantage diminished
by his inability to reap pecuniary gains from those securities. More-
over, unless the publicity deterrent of section 16(a) is allowed to
operate with respect to these securities, there is nothing to prevent
him from acting upon the obvious temptation to exercise his ability
to buy and sell in a manner which conflicts with the standard re-
quired of him as a fiduciary, - "the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive"" - with respect not only to the charitable organization,
but also to the shareholders of his company.
After the publication of Release No. 7793, many persons were
concerned about the effect the release would have on the profit re-
covery provisions of section 16(b)." Section 16(b), however, is
not concerned with the question of beneficial ownership. It is con-
cerned with an entirely different question: the recovery of profits
which the insider himself has realized from short swing trading.7'
Indeed, there is nothing in section 16(b) requiring the insider to
beneficially own the securities from which he profits. As the
court noted in Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas,"2 the re-
porting requirements under section 16(a) "have only slight signifi-
cance in assessing insider liability under Section 16(b)."' Of
69 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
7o Although the Commission did not require persons to amend past reports on which
they had not reported all securities they beneficially owned, it should be noted that the
two year statute of limitations under § 16(b) may not begin to run until the transac-
tions are reported. See Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). But
cf. Carr-Consolidated Biscuit Co v. Moore, 125 F. Supp 423 (M.D.Pa. 1954);Fistel
v. Christman, 13 F.R.D. 245 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
71 Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
72239 F. Supp. 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
7a Id. at 967.
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course, where the insider does realize profits from trading in securi-
ties he beneficially owns, they will be recoverable under section
16(b).74
IV. BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF SECURITIES
HELD IN TRUST
Record title of securities held in a trust is in the trustee. But
where the trustee is an insider, is he also a beneficial owner of the
trust securities? As previously noted,75 the insider-trustee's ability
to buy and sell gives him sufficient benefits of ownership to justify
treating him as a beneficial owner of those securities under section
16 (a), even in the absence of any pecuniary interest in those securi-
ties. And, where the trustee enjoys the unfettered right to vote
those securities, he has sufficient benefits to justify requiring him to
include them in computing whether he is subject to the section.76
The trust provides a clear affirmative answer to the question
of whether the same securities are capable of being beneficially
owned by more than one person. As the beneficiary of a trust is
the person who receives the pecuniary benefits of ownership, he is
a beneficial owner of the trust's securities, irrespective of the trustee's
beneficial ownership of the same securities. For example, assume
A is an officer of corporation X and is a trustee with power to buy
and sell securities of X held in the trust. B, another officer of X,
is a beneficiary of the trust. The trust holds 10,000 shares of X.
By reason of his ability to buy and sell, A has sufficient benefits of
ownership in the 10,000 shares to include them in his reports as
beneficially owned by him. B, by reason of his rights to the pecun-
iary benefits, is also a beneficial owner of those 10,000 shares and
accordingly he, too, should be required to include them in his re-
ports. The fact that the trustee is someone other than an insider
of X would not change the result as to B. The pecuniary benefits
which devolve on him may affect his decisions as an insider77 and,
therefore, shareholders should be informed of his full pecuniary in-
, 
74 Rothenberg v. Sonnabend, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91226 (1961-64 Transfer
Binder) (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. Wallet, 104 F. Supp. 20 (E.D.
La. 1952), aff'd, 202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953); Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Jenkins, 7 F.R.D. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
75 See text accompanying notes 68, 69 supra.
7 6 See Pappas v. Moss, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91694 (D.N.J. 1966), where the
court noted that a trustee of an employee profit sharing and retirement trust was the
beneficial owner of the securities held by the trust.
77 The fact that an insider holds securities in trust may cause him to follow unwise
dividend or other policies designed to enhance the market value of his securities.
1074
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
terest in the company. The necessity of subjecting both trustees and
beneficiaries of a trust to section 16(a) was long ago noted by the
court in Park & Tilford v. Schulte:"8
[T]here is nothing in the legislatvie history of the Act, or other-
wise, to indicate an intent by Congress to permit trustees, as dis-
tinct from individuals in an inside position in a corporation, to
capitalize on information not equally available to other stock-
holders or the investing public. Trustees, like individuals, occupy
the same position in matters of this kind in the absence of some
special exemption in the statute. Defendant's contention, if valid,
would permit an easy avoidance of the Act. Stockholders of rela-
tively large holdings could create trusts for their benefit, and thus
avoid the liability imposed by the statute79
The Commission has adopted a rule which is not inconsistent
with this position since it is only a partial treatment of the question
of beneficial ownership of trust securities, and since it is confined
to those situations where the insider has a clear pecuniary interest
in the trust securities. Under SEC Exchange Act Rule 16a-8,"
beneficial ownership of a trust's securities for the purpose of section
16(a) is deemed to flow from any of three relationships which a
person has to a trust: (1) when the person is trustee, and either he
or members of his immediate family have a vested interest in the
income or corpus of the trust; (2) when the person owns a "vested
beneficial interest" in a trust; and (3) where the person is a settlor
of the trust who has the power to revoke without obtaining the
consent of all the beneficiaries.81 In determining whether a person
is subject to section 16(a) as a more than ten per cent beneficial
owner, the rule excludes the interest of a person in the remainder
of a trust.'3 Exemptions from reporting under section 16(a) the
beneficial ownership deemed by the rule are accorded to persons
having a vested beneficial interest and to settlors having the power
to revoke in two situations: (1) where the equity securities subject to
section 16(a) comprise less than twenty per cent of the market
value of all securities held in the trust; and (2) where the "owner-
ship, acquisition, or disposition of such securities by the trust is
made without prior approval of the settlor or beneficiary."8 "
78CCH FLz. SEc L RiP. 5 90336 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 160 F.2d 984, (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
79 Id. at p. 90845.
8017 C.F.R. § 24 0.16a-8(a) (1)-(3) (rev. ed. 1964).
81 Ibid.
8217 C.F.R. § 240.16a-8 (f) (rev. ed. 1964).
83 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-8(b) (rev. ed. 1964).
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These provisions codified certain staff interpretations concern-
ing the beneficial ownership of securities held in family trusts.8
Notwithstanding the complexity of Rule 16a-8, it is not an ex-
haustive treatment of the subject, for it states the following: "Bene-
ficial ownership of a security for the purpose of Section 16(a) shall
include . . 85 Thus, a person having connections with a trust,
other than those set forth in Rule 16a-8, which give him "benefits
of ownership" in the trust's securities, would seem to have to in-
dude those securities as beneficially owned by him. For example,
assume A, an insider, is a settlor without power to revoke a trust,
the beneficiaries of which are his minor children. Mrs. A is the
trustee. Clearly, because A does not have one of the relationships
to a trust covered by Rule 16a-8, does not mean that A has no
further section 16(a) obligations with respect to those securities.
For the "benefits of ownership" obtained through his wife and
children give him the beneficial ownership of those securities. How-
ever, the Commission noted in Release No. 7793 that "to determine
Section 16(a) obligations to report . . . securities held in a trust
• . . the applicable provisions of the rules and regulations promul-
gated under Section 16 should be consulted."8  Consequently, a
person can rely on specific exemptions from reporting beneficial
ownership under section 16(a) provided in the rules even though
the exemptions seem inconsistent with the "benefits" test.
V. BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF
SECURITIES HELD BY PARTNERSHIPS
Who is a beneficial owner of securities held by a partnership?
Clearly the partnership is. But what about the partners? Although
the general test for determining beneficial ownership of securities
84 Although Rule 16a-8, 17 C.F.R. 240.16a-8(g) (1)-(4) (rev. ed. 1964), was
adopted primarily to deal with certain family trust situations, it also exempts a person
from reporting his beneficial ownership of securities of his company which are held in
the portfolio of "(1) Any holding company registered under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act, (2) Any investment company registered under the Investment Company
Act, (3) A pension or retirement plan holding securities of an issuer whose employees
generally are the beneficiaries of the plan, (4) A business trust with over twenty-five
beneficiaries." Presumably, however, exemption from reporting does not exempt a per-
son from including such beneficially owned securities when computing whether he is
subject to § 16 (a) as the beneficial owner of more than 10%.
8517 C.F.R. § 2 4 0.16a-8(a) (rev. ed. 1964). (Emphasis added.)
8 6 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7793, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5J 26031 (Jan.
19, 1966). (Emphasis added.)
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held by another person 7 would seem to be equally applicable to
determining a partner's beneficial ownership of the partnership's
securities as elsewhere, in view of the Commission's practice of
treating beneficial ownership of securities held by various entities
separately, it may be assumed that the Commission did not intend
to apply the "benefits" test to securities held by a partnership.
There is, of course, a whole body of law devoted to partners
and partnerships. Generally, partnership law is concerned with two
basic problems: (1) those concerning the relationship of the part-
ners and the partnership among themselves, and (2) those con-
cerning the relationship of the partners and the partnership with
third persons. Apparently, the Commission's General Counsel in
1935 was guided by the rules of the first category in saying
that securities held by a partnership are to be regarded as
beneficially owned indirectly by each of the partners to the extent
of his pro rata interest in the partnership.8" This, of course, is
determined by the partnership agreement. Presumably, the focus
here was on only the pecuniary benefits of security ownership. On
this basis, each of the partners was required to count only that num-
ber of shares held by the partnership which represented his interest
in the partnership profits with other securities he beneficially owned
to determine whether he was a beneficial owner of more than ten
per cent. Once a partner achieved a section 16 status, however,
either by reason of his security holdings or as an officer or director,
he could report either the total amount of securities held and traded
by his partnership, or only his proportionate interest in them.
In 1952, following Rattner v. Lehman89 (which held a partner-
director liable under section 16(b) for only his proportionate share
in the- tainted short-swing profits realized by his partnership's trad-
ing in the corporation's securities) the Commission amended its re-
porting requirements to require a partner subject to section 16(a)
to report all the securities held and traded by his partnership." The
8 7 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7793. 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 26031 (Jan.
19, 1966).
88 See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 79, Jan. 13, 1935, revised and republished
as SEC Exchange Act Release No. 1965, 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 26041-50 (Dec.
21, 1938).
89 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952).
90 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 4718, June 18, 1952 (proposed) and SEC Ex-
change Act Release No. 4754, Sept. 24, 1952 (adopted). This provision is now in-
corporated in Instruction 10 of SEC Exchange Act Form 3 and Instruction 9 of SEC
Exchange Act Form 4.
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partner could, in addition to reporting the full partnership holdings,
indicate his proportionate interest in such amount. However, in the
release announcing these changes the Commission did not indicate
whether the new rule was to be followed by a partner in computing
his status as a more than ten per cent beneficial owner.9'
The 1952 amendment? 2 seems to represent a shift from that
body of partnership law dealing with the relationship of partners
and the partnership amongst themselves to that body of law devoted
to the relationship of partners and the partnership with third per-
sons. The law of partnerships has long recognized that a partner can
obtain "benefits equivalent to those of ownership" from partnership
property as to which his legal or equitable rights are questionable. In
a sense, this is the result of the well established principle that a part-
ner binds his partnership in all matters falling within the scope of
the partnership business, irrespective of the terms of the partnership
agreement. 3 Consequently, since section 16 is devoted not to a
partner's relationships with his other partners, but rather to the
relationship that he has to third parties - namely, the corporation
and its shareholders - this principle, in conjunction with the gen-
eral "benefits" test, should be the guide in determining whether a
partner is a beneficial owner, for purposes of section 16(a), of
securities held by his partnership.
By reference to this standard, it is clear that each of the part-
ners has "benefits substantially equivalent to those of ownership"
in all the securities held by the partnership. He not only has
the pecuniary benefits, but also has the complete ability to buy, sell,
and vote all of them. Moreover, it should be recognized that his
pecuniary interest in the partnership's securities is not limited by
his interest in the partnership's profits, since a partner is regarded
as the co-owner of an undivided interest in all partnership prop-
erty.
94
The failure to consider each partner as the beneficial owner of
all the securities held by the partnership for purposes of determin-
ing the jurisdictional application of section 16, in spite of his ability
to purchase, sell, or vote all those securities, has the undesirable
effect of allowing partners to use their partnership holdings to gain
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 This principle, of course, is a matter of agency law.
94 See, e.g., LATrY, INTRoDUCrION TO Busnqss ASSOCIATIONS 523-27 (1951).
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inside information while simultaneously freeing them to trade with
virtual impunity in their individual accounts0 5  For example, as-
sume that A and B are equal partners in the A & B Partnership
which holds twelve per cent of corporation X. While the A & B
Partnership itself would be subject to section 16, because of its in-
side position, " neither A nor B individually would be subject so
long as the other securities which each beneficially owns when added
to his proportionate interest in the A & B Partnership (six per cent)
does not exceed ten per cent. Consequently, both A and B are left
free to engage in their individual accounts in the full range of
abuses made possible by their inside position. Hence, they could,
on the basis of inside information, such as that dividends were to
be cut, sell their individual holdings, and then once the news is
made public, buy them back without incurring section 16(b) lia-
bility. This is, of course, precisely the type of evil which section
16 was designed to prevent. Clearly, the only way to prevent A
and B from successfully perpetrating these abuses at the expense of
the other shareholders of the company is to recognize that each of
the partners receives sufficient "benefits substantially equivalent to
those of ownership" from the partnership's securities to constitute
him the beneficial owner of all the partnership's securities, both for
the purpose of determing whether he is subject to section 16(a), as
well as for the purpose of determining what securities must be re-
ported once he is subject to the section.
95 An actual abuse of inside position would, of course, give rise to a cause of action
to the injured party for his damages under SEC Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
S 240.10b-5 (rev. ed. 1964). But Rule lOb-5 is no substitute for § 16(b). As the
Second Circuit has stated: "A subjective standard of proof, requiring a showing of an
actual unfair use of inside information, would render senseless the provisions of the leg-
islation limiting the liability period to six months.... tlts total effect would be to
render the statute little more of an incentive to insiders to refrain from profiteering at
the expense of the outside stockholder than are the common law rules of liability...."
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943). See also Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934). Although "an inquiry into whether
section 16(b) is penal or remedial seems bound to result in the conclusion that, like the
Sherman Act, it is both" (Epstein v. Shindler, 200 F. Supp. 836, 837 (S.D.N.Y.1961),
it should be noted that the injured shareholder may recover his damages while the cor-
poration recovers short-swing trading profits under § 16 (b) for § 28 of the Exchange
Act, 48 Star. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1964), which prohibits dual recovery
under the act, does not protect against dual liability.
90 A partnership might also be required to file reports as a "director" of an issuer
if the partnership "deputized" a partner to serve as a director of the issuer. See Rattner
v. Lehman, 98 F. Supp. 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952);
Blau v. Lehman, 173 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), affld, 286 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.
1960), Mfld, 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
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VI. BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF
SECURITIES HELD BY A CORPORATION
A corporation obviously beneficially owns any securities it holds
of another company. Such securities are an asset of the corporation.
But, is the corporation the sole beneficial owner of such securities,
or may other persons also beneficially own such securities?
As previously noted," a person controlling the assets of a chari-
table organization should be regarded as the beneficial owner of all
the securities held by the organization, despite his inability to ob-
tain taxable income from those securities. For control of the cor-
poration gives him the ability and incentive to manage the securi-
ties of the charitable organization for his own ends in a way which
may conflict with the fiduciary obligation he owes to both the chari-
table organization and to the shareholders of the corporation of
which he is an insider. Similiarly, any person or persons control-
ling a noncharitable corporation holding securities of the issuer
of which they are insiders should be regarded as beneficially own-
ing all the securities held by that corporation. 8
Assume X is an insider of A Co. and that he controls B, Inc.
B, Inc. owns securities of A Co. X should be regarded as the bene-
ficial owner of all the A Co. securities held by B, Inc. As a control-
ling person of B, Inc., X is in a position to obtain the pecuniary
benefits of ownership of the A Co. securities, for he can be certain
that any such benefits arising out of B, Inc.'s holdings will flow
through to him, e.g., by increasing his salary, bonus, or B, Inc.'s divi-
dend. Moreover, X can control the purchase, sale, and voting of
A Co.'s securities held by B, Inc. This gives him the ability and
the incentive to use these shares for his own selfish interests. He
could, for example, use them to manipulate the market, or, if X
is not already an officer or director of A Co., he could use the vote
to secure such position. Consequently, if X is in control of B, Inc.,
he is in a position to obtain the benefits of ownership of all securi-
ties of A Co. held by B, Inc. It is immaterial whether X's control
of B, Inc. rests on his status as a stockholder or his position with the
company, for the primary basis for his beneficial ownership of the
A. Co. securities comes not from the possible direct pecuniary bene-
9 7 See text accompanying notes 68, 69 supra.
9 8 Section 1 (6) of The Securities Act, 1966, now pending before the Ontario, Can-
ada legislature provides: "A person shall be deemed to own benefically securities, in-
cluding capital securities, beneficially owned by a company controlled by him or by an




fits he may receive from those securities, but rather from his ability
to control their purchase, sale, and voting for his own selfish ends.
Unless X is regarded as the beneficial owner of all of the A Co.
securities held by B, Inc., he is in the same position to evade the Ex-
change Act by trading in his individual account while using the
inside position of B, Inc. in the same way that an individual partner
can use his partnership's inside position. That is, where B, Inc.
owns more than ten per cent of A Co., unless X is regarded as the
beneficial owner of all the A Co. securities held by B, Inc., he is
free to use the inside information obtained through B, Inc. for his
own benefit with virtual impunity.
The view that a controlling person of B, Inc. is the beneficial
owner of all the securities of A Co. was set forth in Blaa v. Mis-
sion." In that case the court held that the Mission Corporation,
which controlled the Mission Development Company (Mission owned
sixty per cent of the outstanding voting stock of Development) was
the beneficial owner of all the securities of Tide Water Associated
Oil Company held by Development for purposes of determining
whether Mission Corporation was the beneficial owner of more
than ten per cent of Tide Water. The court stated the following:
"There can be no doubt that Mission, by virtue of its absolute con-
trol of Development, was indirectly the owner of all Tide Water
"2100stock held by Development ....
Although Mission had "absolute" control by virtue of its more
than fifty per cent stock ownership, there is no reason to think that
the result would have been different if Mission had actually con-
trolled Development, but owned less than fifty per cent of Develop-
ment.'0 ' Accordingly, a person enjoying actual control of a cor-
poration, whether by corporate position, security holdings, or other-
wise, should be regarded as the beneficial owner of all the securi-
ties held by the controlled corporation for section 16(a) purposes.
The only Commission statement concerning beneficial owner-
ship of securities held through a corporation is in accord with the
above insofar as it requires that a person be in control of a corpora-
tion before he is considered to beneficially own securities held by
9212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954).
10 0 Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016
(1954). (Emphasis added.)
11 The term "control" is defined in SEC Exchange Act Rule 12b-2 (f), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12b-2 (f) (rev. ed. 1964) to mean "the possession directly or indirectly, of the
power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person,
whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise."
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that corporation. But it differs from the above with respect to the
amount of securities such a controlling person is considered to
beneficially own. This statement is found in Release No. 196502 in
which the Commission published the following opinion of its Gen-
eral Counsel:
In my opinion, no consideration need be given by the owner of
stock in a holding company to the holdings of that company, ex-
cept in a case where the holding merely provides a medium
through which one person, or several persons in a small group, in-
vest or trade in securities, and where such company has no other
substantial business. In such a case, a person in control of the
holding company who is an officer or director of the issuer of a
listed equity security owned by the holding company, or whose in-
terest in such security through the holding company (together with
the amount of such security of which he is otherwise directly or
indirectly the beneficial owner) aggregates more than ten percent
of such security, should file a report in accordance with Rule
16a-1.... This report should include the holding company's own-
ership of such security, and transactions by it therein, to the extent
of such person's interest. Such control might in fact be joint, and
in such a case all persons sharing such control, regardless of
whether one of such persons holds a majority of the voting stock
of the holding company, would, to the extent of their respective
interests, be under a similar duty to report in respect of securities
owned by the holding company. The filing of reports by such con-
trolling person or persons would not, in my opinion, relieve the
holding company from itself filing reports pursuant to Rule 16a-1
if the holding company were the owner of more than ten per cent
of the equity security in question.
The existence of other substantial business is merely of eviden-
tiary value on the question of whether the corporation is actually
used by one person or a small group as a medium for investing or
trading in securities. 10 3
In 1961 this opinion was impliedly overruled by the Commis-
Aion, at least in part, without explanation, when the instructions
to the section 16(a) reporting forms were amended to require a
reporting person to disclose all securities beneficially owned through
a corporation, rather than his proportionate interest therein.10 4 He
may still, in addition, indicate his proportionate interest in the total
amount of securities held by the corporation based on his stock-
10 2 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 1965, 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 55 26041-50
(Dec. 21, 1938).
1oa Ibid. The existence of "other substantial business" would probably be given
very little evidentiary value today. Cf. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F.
Supp. 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
304 See Instruction 10 of SEC Exchange Act Form 3 and Instruction 9 of SEC Ex-
change Act Form 4, adopted SEC Exchange Act Release No. 6487, Mar. 9, 1961.
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holdings.' °5 Whether this revision of the instructions to the re-
porting form was meant to also change the method of computing
percentage beneficial ownership for the jurisdictional purposes of
section 16(a) is not dear. However, in view of the court's opinion
in the Mission case, and the purpose of section 16(a), it seems that
a person should include all securities held by a controlled corpora-
tion in computing whether he is subject to section 16(a), in addi-
tion to reporting all these securities once he is subject to the section.
VII. OPTIONS, WARRANTS AND OTHER RIGHTS
Any "right to subscribe to or purchase" an equity security is
defined as an "equity security" in Exchange Act Section 3(a)
(11). °6 Therefore, a person who is subject to section 16(a) is
required to report any acquisition or disposition of such equity.secu-
rities of his issuer in his reports filed under section 16(a). This,
however, does not answer the question of whether the holder of an
option or other privilege or right to buy0 7 is a beneficial owner of
the underlying securities. To resolve this question it is necessary
to determine what benefits of ownership of the underlying secu-
rities repose in the option-holder.
Clearly, as the holder of an option to buy does not have title
or possession of the underlying securities, he has no right to vote
them, and he has no right to receive dividends on them. How-
ever, irrespective of any relationship to or understanding with the
record owner of the underlying securities, which might give him
benefits of ownership pertaining to the vote, the holder of an option
to buy obtains valuable benefits of ownership from the underlying
securities, merely by reason of the existence of the option. For
once he has an unqualified right to exercise the option, he has the
1
0 5 At the time the Commission proposed to revise Forms 3 and 4 it also proposed
to adopt a rule that a person did not need to file a report with respect to his indirect
interest in a security held by any corporation or business trust unless (1) such indirect
interest is evidenced by securities which are convertible into the securities held by the
corporation or trust, or (2) he directly or indirectly beneficially owned more than 10%
of the corporation or trust. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 6435, Dec. 12, 1960.
This proposal was subsequently withdrawn without explanation. SEC Exchange Act
Release No. 6487, Mar. 9, 1961.
10648 Stat. 884 (1934), as amended, 78 U.S.C. 5 78c(a) (11) (1964).
107 An option is a type of unilateral contract. 1 WiLusTON, CoNTRAcTs § 61a
(3d ed. 1957) and authorities cited therein. Although there are various types of option
instruments in the financial world, induding warrants, contractual rights evidenced by
convertible securities, "when issued" stock, puts, calls, strips and straddles, for ease of
presentation, the term "option" or "right to buy" or "right to sell" includes all these
types of contracts.
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firm assurance that a fixed quantity of stock can be acquired or dis-
posed of at a fixed price. On this basis he can make trading com-
mitments with a minimum of financial risk. The speculative bene-
fits of the underlying securities that accrue to an option-holder were
noted by the court in Blaa v. Ogsbury:08 "It matters not to the
speculator who has title or possession or who can vote the stock or
receive dividends. What he needs is firm assurance that a fixed
quantity can be acquired or disposed of at a fixed price; and his
commitments are on that basis."'109
Are these speculative advantages alone sufficient to constitute
the option-holder the beneficial owner of the underlying securi-
ties? Or, is it necessary to wait until the exercise occurs at which
time the option-holder obtains his traditional ownership rights in
the securities? Once again it is necessary to resolve the question
to effectuate the broad remedial purposes of the Exchange Act.
Reference to the legislative history and the abuses revealed by
the investigations demonstrate that the speculative benefits alone
are enough to constitute a person a beneficial owner of the securi-
ties underlying an option. The record is replete with examples of
how options were used to further and effectuate many of the prac-
tices which were made the subjects of sections 9 and 10. 10 So wide-
spread was their use in connection with market manipulations that
the Senate Banking and Currency Committee concluded that "many
of the most flagrant abuses upon the stock exchange would not be
possible without the aid of options.""' And so concerned was the
Committee on Stock Exchange Regulation about the possible abuses
inherent in options, it recommended that every issuer "report to the
stock exchange within 48 hours after the granting thereof of any op-
tion given upon its stock.""' 2 That this recommendation was not
adopted does not mean that the congressional concern over regulat-
ing options subsided. Because of the considerable complexity of the
transactions in which options were used and the great variety of
forms of options in existence, the Congress determined to leave the
general regulation of options to the Commission. In section 9,
108 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954).
109 Id. at 427.
110 See S. REp. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 45-68 (1934).
"'S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934).
112 Report to Secretary of Commerce of Committee on Stock Exchange Regulation
attached to Letter from the President of the United States to the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, Jan. 25, 1934.
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which applies to "any person," it gave the Commission broad rule-
making authority to deal with the option. The fact that insiders
would be covered by provisions of the act addressed to "any per-
son," however, did not persuade the Congress that special provisions
were not needed to deal with the activities of insiders - hence,
the existence of section 16.
That insiders' transactions in options were intended by Con-
gress to be covered by section 16, in addition to the more general
provisions of section 9, is evident from a comparison of the con-
gressional view on "puts and calls" with the statutory definition of
the terms "purchase" and "sale" and the use of such terms in sec-
tion 16. The technical definition of a "put" is an option contract
which gives the holder the right to sell securities; the technical defi-
nition of a "call" is an option contract which gives the holder the
right to buy securities."' The Senate Banking and Currency Com-
mittee, which was faced with the shocking evidence uncovered in the
investigations, had little interest in the technical labels which
might be attached to these devices. It was more concerned with
the realities of the securities market and the role that such devices
played in these markets. The Committee's focus was, quite prop-
erly, on what these devices actually meant in terms of the specula-
tion and practices in the market place which were made possible
through their use. Thus, it saw these devices in the following terms:
"A 'put' is the privilege of delivering or not delivering the securities
sold. A 'call' is the privilege of calling for or not calling for the
securities [bought]."" 4
To give meaning to this view Congress provided that the term
"purchase" was to "include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise
acquire" and that the term "sale" was to "include any contract to
sell or otherwise dispose of." An application of these statutory defi-
nitions to puts and calls leads to the conclusion that the acquisition
of a "call" is a "purchase," and that the acquisition of a "put" is a
"sale," of the underlying securities. A "purchase" and a "sale"
118 The terms "put" and "call" have been somewhat more formally defined by the
staff of the SEC: "A 'put' is a contract which gives the holder the right for a stated
period of time to sell a specified number of shares of stock to the writer of the contract
at a price per share which was fixed at the time when the option was bought. A 'call'
is a similar contract which gives the holder the right to purchase the stock from the
writer at a fixed price." SEC, DIVISION OF TRADING AND EXCHANGES, REPORT ON
PUT ANID CALL OPTIONS 7 (1961).
114S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 n.17 (1934).
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which necessarily cause "changes in beneficial ownership" of the
underlying securities are required to be reported under section
16(a), irrespective of whether a "put" or a "call" is regarded as
an "equity security of the issuer." "'
Unless the statutory definitions of "purchase" and "sale" are so
applied with respect to puts, calls, and similar option devices, the
congressional objectives in creating a special section to deal with
the activities of insider abuses is nullified with respect to the "most
flagrant abuses" - those predicated upon the use of the option.
Thus, to permit the deterrent and informational purposes of sec-
tion 16(a) to operate in this highly significant area of insider activ-
ity, it is imperative to consider the holder of an option to buy as
having acquired the beneficial ownership of the underlying securi-
ties, once he obtains the speculative benefits of those securities. The
next question is: when are these speculative benefits secured?
As to all the various types of options and contracts to buy
which exist in our complex financial and commercial world,
it is the certainty of the right to buy and the resultant assurance to
the option-holder that the underlying securities can be obtained at
a price certain which permits him to engage in speculative activities
with the underlying securities. It is this assurance that allows the
speculator to trade against the option with a minimum of financial
risk. The requisite certainly quite obviously exists where the ques-
tions of whether and when to exercise are fully within the optionee's
discretion. Where the exercise of the option is subject to a contingency
or condition beyond the control or discretion of the optionee, the
speculation cannot occur. Presumably, a contract or option con-
taining such a contingency or condition was the focus of SEC Ex-
change Act Release No. 116, the first of three different Commis-
sion positions which have bearing on this subject. In that Release
the Commission "made public the substance of another opinion
rendered by its General Counsel, regarding the time at which
changes in ownership are considered to occur for the purpose of
reports required of directors, officers and principal stockholdeds
115 In Miller v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 223 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.
1963), the court granted defendant's motion for a summary judgment on the theory
that a "put" and "call" issued by a third person are not equity securities of the issuer.
The granting of the motion was reversed, 337 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964). For a critical
analysis of the lower court's opinion see, Michaely & Lee, Put and Call Options: Cri-
teria for Applicability of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 40
NOTRE DAME L&W. 239 (1965).
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under Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.""'  The
opinion was as follows:
In my opinion an officer, director or stockholder is to be deemed
to have acquired beneficial ownership of a security at the time
when he takes a firm commitment for the purchase thereof, and to
divest himself of such beneficial ownership at the time when he
takes a firm commitment for the sale thereof. If it is necessary
that certain conditions be satisfied prior to the consummation of
the purchase or sale, and if it is uncertain whether such conditions
will be satisfied, then it would appear that the officer, director or
stockholder would not acquire beneficial ownership. 117
The Second Circuit cited Release No. 116 in Stella v. Graham-
Paige"' stating: "The date when a purchaser becomes a 'beneficial
owner' is that on which he 'incurred an irrevocable liability to take
and pay for the stock' when his 'rights and obligations became
fixed.""'" This case involved an action brought under section
16(b) of the act, in which it was alleged that Graham-Paige, as
a more than ten per cent beneficial owner of Kaiser-Brazer stock,
had realized substantial profits2 ° from a purchase and sale of such
stock within a period of less than six months.
Graham-Paige had contracted with Kaiser-Frazer to acquire
750,000 shares of Kaiser-Brazer stock in return for assets and
3,000,000 dollars in cash. These 750,000 shares, when added to
other shares beneficially owned by Graham-Paige would have made
it a more than ten per cent beneficial owner of Kaiser-Brazer.
Graham-Paige was to use its best efforts to borrow the money from
a specific bank. The bank's obligation to loan the money to
Graham-Paige, however, was conditioned on having guarantees of the
loan from both Joseph W. Frazer, Graham-Paige's president, and the
Henry J. Kaiser Company. But, if Graham-Paige were unable to
obtain the loan it might elect to terminate the agreement with
Kaiser-Brazer. Consequently, Graham-Paige had a right to acquire
116 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 116, 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. RP,. 55 26026-27
(March 9, 1935).
117 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 116, 2 CCH FaD. Sac. L. RaP. 5 26027 (March
9,1935).
118 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd as modified, 232 F.2d 299, (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956). In so stating the court erroneously relied on Blau
v. Obsbury, 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954) where this test was used to determine the
date of a purchase under § 16(b).
119 Id. at 301.
120 The trial court had found that Graham-Paige had realized profits of $434,787.86
on the transaction in question. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motor Corp., 232 F.2d 299, 302
(2d Cir. 1956).
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the stock of Kaiser-Frazer if it could obtain 3,000,000 dollars and
an obligation to take and pay for the stock if the requisite guar-
antees to the bank loan were obtained.
The agreement was dated December 12, 1946. The guarantee
was obtained and the contract performed on February 10, 1947.
The court found that Graham-Paige sold 155,000 shares on or be-
fore August 8, 1947. The date the 750,000 shares were "pur-
chased," however, was in question.
Section 3(a) (13) of the Exchange Act provides: "The terms
'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract to buy, purchase, or
otherwise acquire."'' Thus, under the statutory definition of pur-
chase, the court could have found the purchase to have occurred
on either December 12, 1946, the date the contract was entered
into, or February 10, 1947, the date the guarantee was obtained and
the contract performed. Faced with alternative dates, only one of
which, February 10, 1947, would effectuate the purposes of section
16(b) the court chose that date rather than the date, December 12,
1946, which would have prevented the section from operating.
This result is in accord with the choices made by the courts in sec-
tion 16(b) cases when faced with two possible purchase or sale
dates, only one of which falls within the time limits of the section.
This practice was recently explained by the First Circuit in the case
of Booth v. Varian Associates: m
The question ... [is] one of balancing the respective advant-
ages and disadvantages of each contended for 'purchase' date and
determining which one, if held to be the date of purchase, would
be more likely to lend itself to the abuses the statute was designed
to protect against.... In addition, since we are dealing with a
remedial measure, it is important that we consider the probability
of bringing the insider to task for his violation of the statute. If one
date lends itself to the possibility of abuse as much as the other
but, because of the statute of limitations attached to Section 16 (b),
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to gain recovery against an
insider who 'purchased' on one of the contended for dates, then
practical experience dictates that the purchase date within the re-
covery period should be selected as the one the statute was designed
to include.ltu
121 Exchange Act 5 3(a) (13), 48 Star. 884 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78c
(a) (13) (1964). (Emphasis added.)
122 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
123 Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
961 (1965). Indeed the courts have tended to reject entirely the well known rule of
statutory construction, cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex, in determining whether
a transaction is a "purchase" or "sale" under § 16(b). If they find a transaction is
within the purposes of § 16(b) a "purchase" and "sale" is deemed to have occurred.
See, e.g., Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 76
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The Graham-Paige court, not surprisingly, found that the sec-
tion 16(b) purchase occurred. on February 10, 1947, within less
than six months of the sale. 4 It also found Graham-Paige achieved
the status of a beneficial owner of more than ten per cent on the
same day. Consequently, the court's determination of when bene-
ficial ownership was acquired in this case was governed by the
limited time period and purposes of section 16(b), rather than the
purposes of section 16(a). Had there been a sale of securities
within less than six months of the December 12, 1946 possible
"purchase" date, but more than six months from the February 10,
1947 "purchase" date, it is likely that the court would have chosen
December 12, 1946 as the day on which Graham-Paige "purchased"
and became the beneficial owner of the underlying securities, to
carry out the remedial purposes of section 16(b).
The court did not consider the possibility of separating the
acquisition of beneficial ownership date from the section 16 (b) pur-
chase date, but rather assumed that the two had to coincide. How-
ever, as there is more than one possible "purchase" date for finding
a matchable purchase and sale within the time limit of section
16(b), it follows that there is also more than one possible date at
which beneficial ownership of the underlying securities can be ac-
quired. As the determination of the date of a section 16(b) pur-
chase is governed by the purposes of that section, so should the
determination of the date of acquisition of beneficial ownership be
governed by the purposes of section 16(a).
Clearly Congress thought that section 16(a) would disclose
all transactions which might give rise to section 16(b) liability.
Consequently, beneficial ownership under section 16(a) should be
deemed to arise on the first of the possible dates on which a section
(1947); Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1960), af!d, 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
If it is not within the purposes of S 16(b) then no "purchase" or "sale" is deemed to
have occurred. See, e.g., Blau v. Lamb, Civil No. 29940, 2d Cir., June 27, 1966; Blau
v. Max Factor & Co., CCH FED. SEc. L REp. 5 91497 (9th Cir. 1965); Ferraiolo v.
Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959); Roberts
v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954); Shaw v. Dreyfus,
172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1949).
i The § 16(b) "sale" date was found to have occurred on the date the contract
was entered into, the court rejecting the arguments that no sale could exist until various
conditions to the performance were removed. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132
F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The Second Circuit's acceptance of this "sale" date
provides further evidence of its belief of the necessity of subjecting the Grabam-Paige
transaction to the section.
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16(b) purchase may be found to have occurred. 5 It is only in
this way that the section 16(a) reports can disclose all transac-
tions which may give rise to section 16(b) liability and disclose to
public investors the insider's activities in the securities of his com-
pany. Thus, in Graham-Paige the court should have found (1)
that Graham-Paige became the beneficial owner of the securities
underlying its contract with Kaiser-Frazer on December 12, 1946
(when its right to buy these securities first came into existence)
and (2) that the "purchase" of those securities, for the purpose of
section 16(b), occurred on February 10, 1947 (the date when the
condition to its being required to take and pay for the stock was
removed). In this way it would have given effect to the purposes
of both subsections (a) and (b) of section 16.
Because the Second Circuit dealt with "beneficial ownership" as
if it were dependent upon the section 16(b) "purchase" it was
forced to attempt to justify the result that a person does not become
a section 16 "insider" until the "exercise of an option," on the
theory "that one who holds an unexercised option is not usually in
a position to obtain such [inside] information from the company. ' 126
This conclusion ignores that a person who negotiates with the com-
pany or an insider to acquire the right to buy a large amount of
stock has access to inside information. That such option holders
do obtain inside information in the course of the option negotiations
and thereafter abuse such information was amply demonstrated in
the hearings.127 Indeed, unless the option and underlying securi-
ties are registered under the Securities Act of 1933 the purchaser
must have access to material information, whether or not it is also
available to the public. Otherwise, the transaction would violate
125 In Blau v. Lamb, Civil No. 29940, 2d Cir. June 27, 1966, the court stated:
When the convertible security is purchased, converted, and the underlying
security sold, all within less than six months, we believe the entire profit re-
sulting from the transaction is recoverable, either on the theory that the ac-
crued profit on the preferred as well as the profit on the common has been
realized, 'within . .. [a] period of less than 6 months, for purposes of
the statute, or else upon the theory that, under such circumstances, the pur-
chase of a convertible preferred may be treated as a purchase of common stock,
for the statute defines 'purchase' as including 'any contract to buy, purchase
or otherwise acquire,' and the purchase of the convertible security includes a
contractual right to acquire the conversion security.
126 Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299, 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 831 (1956).
127 See S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 36-46 (1934).
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section 5 of the Securities Acte2" and SEC Exchange Act Rule
10b-5. m°
The informational purposes of section 16(a) would also be
served by considering the option-holder as beneficial owner of the
underlying securities. It is possible for the holder to obtain the con-
tinuing benefits of an inside position by reason of the constant threat
which he holds over management that he will exercise his option
and vote against them. Conversely, the holder of an option might
not reveal his position to management, but rather keep it secret
until he exercises and secures his rights to prevent present manage-
ment from taking action which might frustrate his bid for control.
Both situations, however, argue strongly for requiring the option-
holder to count the underlying securities, so that when his beneficial
ownership reaches the jurisdictional amount, both management
and shareholders may be apprised of the possible change in
control.' Can the importance to shareholders and other investors
of knowing as soon as possible that a well known corporate raider
had acquired options to buy more than ten per cent be questioned?
Of equal importance to the outside public in its attempt to evaluate
the company and its prospects would be what changes occur in
present management's beneficial ownership after it learns of the
existence of the option. Consequently, a person should include the
securities underlying an option or any other right to buy to com-
pute his beneficial ownership for the purpose of determining if he
is subject to section 16(a), as the beneficial owner of more than
ten per cent of a class of registered equity security.
This conclusion is based on the assumption that the option-
holder has a right to exercise his option which is not subject to a
contingency beyond his control. Otherwise, he normally is not in
a position to utilize the underlying securities in his speculative
activities and consequently need not be considered the beneficial
owner of the underlying securities for the jurisdictional purposes of
section 16(a)."' Release No. 116 seems limited today to deter-
mining beneficial ownership in this context, for in all other respects
128 See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). See generally, 1
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 653-65 (2d ed. 1961).
129 See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 135 F. Supp. 176 (1955), mod-
ified on other grounds, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
13 0 See Chicago So. Shore & So. Bend R.R. v. Monon R.R., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
91525 (N.D. IM. 1965).
131 Cf. Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962).
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it is inconsistent with the SEC's second and alternative test for
determining beneficial ownership set forth this year in Release No.
7793:
A person also is regarded as the beneficial owner of securities held
in the name of a spouse, minor children or other person, even
though he does not obtain therefrom the aforementioned benefits
of ownership, if he can vest or revest tide in himself at once, or at
some future time.132
Once a person is subject to section 16(a), SEC Exchange Act
Rule 16a-6ls requires him to report his transactions in options and
other rights to buy or sell equity securities of his company, irre-
spective of any contingency on such rights. That rule provides:
The acquisition or disposition of any transferable option, put, call,
spread or straddle shall be deemed such a change in the beneficial
ownership of the security to which such privilege relates as to re-
quire the filing of a statement reflecting the acquisition or disposi-
tion of such privilege. Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall
exempt any person from filing the statements required upon the
exercise of such option, put, call, spread or straddle.13 4
Rule 16a-6 makes it dear that a person already subject to the
section must also file a report on the exercise of an option. Thus
two reports of "changes in beneficial ownership" are required as to
the same securities. This answers the question of whether the statu-
tory term "changes in beneficial ownership" includes both qualita-
132SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7793, 2 CCH FPD. SEc. L. REP. 5 26031 at
19057-3 (Jan. 19, 1966). (Emphasis added.)
15317 C.F.R. § 24 0.16 a-6 (rev. ed. 1964).
134 Ibid. A proposed amendment to this rule (SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7794,
Jan. 20, 1966) would delete the word "transferable" and would exempt persons from
reporting non-transferable options received under a plan meeting the requirements of
SEC Exchange Act Rule 16b-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (Supp. 1966), which exempts
from § 16(b) the acquisition of an option (but not the acquisition of stock on the
exercise of an option) pursuant to a qualified or restricted stock option plan or pur-
suant to an employee stock purchase plan, which meets the requirements of the Internal
Revenue Code and is approved by shareholders as required by the rule. The proposed
amendment would also require reporting, as a change in beneficial ownership under §
16(a), the pledge or hypothecation of a security, the release of a security from a pledge
or hypothecation, the loan of a security, or the return of a loaned security. The
qualitative change in beneficial ownership is presumably the basis for the reports for
such transaction. The release does not state whether the party on the other side of the
transaction may have a sufficient interest in the loaned, pledged, or hypothecated secu-
rity to make him a beneficial owner of the security for the purposes of computing
whether he is a beneficial owner of more than 10% of a class. It would seem that
ordinarily he would not. But the terms of a particular pledge or loan might require
a different result. See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 128, at 1108 n.275. Neither does the
rule require the pledgee or borrower who is the reporting person to disclose a change in
his beneficial ownership, although it seems dear the Commission could require this if
it deemed it necessary.
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tive and quantitative changes, since both reports could not be re-
quired because of quantitative changes.
The rule, however, does not indicate whether the first report
on the acquisition of an option is required because the insider has
had a qualitative change of beneficial ownership with respect to the
securities of his issuer, or because he has had a quantitative change,
by reason of acquiring the beneficial ownership of the underlying
securities. Presumably, the first report is addressed to a quantita-
tive change and the second to a qualitative change - for how can
a person have a qualitative change in his beneficial ownership of
securities unless he has first acquired beneficial ownership of them?
Since the first report is apparently required because the insider
has effected a quantitative change in his beneficial ownership by
acquiring the beneficial ownership of the securities underlying the
option, it would follow that a person not already subject to section
16, on acquiring an option or other right to buy, would effect the
same quantitative change in his beneficial ownership. Accord-
ingly, by implication, the rule could be read to require a person to
count the securities underlying the option (along with other secu-
rities he beneficially owns) to determine whether he is a beneficial
owner of more than ten per cent. This result, of course, is not de-
manded by the literal language of the rule, although there is some
indication in the releases proposing and adopting it that such a re-
sult was intended.'35 On the other hand, a comparison of the lan-
guage of Rule 16a-6 and SEC Exchange Act Rule 16a-8136 tends
to support the conclusion that the Commission intended Rule 16a-6
to apply only to persons already subject to the section. The un-
135 Rule 16a-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-6 (rev. ed. 1964) was originally adopted as
SEC Exchange Act Rule X-16A-1. In proposing the amendment to Rule X-16A-1 in
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 4718 (June 18, 1952) the Commission stated:
Rule X-16A-1, at present, sets forth the persons who must report their hold-
ings and the changes in their holdings of securities pursuant to Section 16.
It designates the equity securities with respect to which reports are required
and the type of information which should be included in the reports. How-
ever, no provision of the rule, at present, deals with options, puts, calls, or
straddles.
The proposed rule seeks to remedy the omission by requiring holders of
options, puts, calls, straddles, and other such privileges to file the reports
required by Section 16(a). It has been suggested that complete disclosure
of beneficial ownership and changes in such ownership of equity securities
requires a disclosure of holdings and changes in the holdings of the options,
puts, calls, and straddles which relate to those securities.
In adopting the rule in SEC Exchange Act Release No. 4754 (Sept. 19, 1952)
the Commission stated simply: 'The new rule X-16A-1 requires the holders of options,
puts, calls, spreads and straddles to file the reports required by section 16(a)."
136 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-8 (rev. ed. 1964).
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equivocal resolution of the problem in Rule 16a-8 which says "bene-
ficial ownership of a security for the purpose of Section 16(a) shall
include" makes it more likely than not that the Commission in-
tended Rule 16a-6 to apply only to persons already subject to sec-
tion 16. Notwithstanding the ambiguity of Rule 16a-6, in view
of the purposes of section 16(a) indicated above, and the Com-
mission's position in Release No. 7793, a person should include
the securities underlying an option for the jurisdictional purposes
of section 16 (a). 87
Sometimes record ownership of the securities underlying an op-
tion is in the company; sometimes in another person. Where the
record ownership of the securities underlying an option is in the
company regarding the option-holder as having acquired the bene-
ficial ownership of the underlying securities at the time he acquires
the option creates a problem in determining beneficial ownership
of more than ten per cent of a class. For under SEC Exchange Act
Rule 16a-2,35 percentage ownership is based on the amount of
securities of a class outstanding which does not include securities
held by or for the account of the issuer.
If the option-holder counts the securities underlying his option
along with other securities he beneficially owns, and measures that
against the securities then outstanding, the option holder may be
subject to section 16(a) as the beneficial owner of more than ten
per cent before he exercises an option, but not afterward, because
137 Because a person is regarded as the "beneficial owner" of a security for the pur-
poses of § 16(a) of the Exchange Act, however, does not mean that he should be con-
sidered to "own" the security for purposes of the short sale prohibitions of 5 16(c) or
SEC Exchange Act Rule 3a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a-3 (rev. ed. 1964) defining the term
"short sale," or SEC Exchange Act Rules lOa-1 and lOa-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1, -2
(rev. ed. 1964) regulating short sales and covering purchases. In addition to the fact
that the term "beneficial owner" has a different meaning than "owns" the purposes of
§ 16(a) are different than the purposes of regulating short sales, thus requiring an in-
terpretation that will carry out the purposes of each respective provision. The meaning
of the term "own" for the purposes of Rules 3b-3, lOa-1 and 1Oa-2 were described in a
published opinion of a Commission Division Director. SEC Exchange Act Release No.
1571, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 59 22685-95 (Feb. 5, 1938) stated:
Ownership of Securities. A person is deemed to own a security if (1) he
or his agent has title to it; or (2) he has purchased or has entered into an
unconditional contract, binding on both parties, to purchase it but has not yet
received it;, or (3) he owns a security convertible into or exchangeable for it
and has tendered such security for conversion or exchange; or (4) he has an
option to purchase or acquire it and has exercised such option; or (5) he has
rights or warrants to subscribe to it and has exercised such right or warrants.
He is not deemed to own a security if he owns securities convertible into or
exchangeable for it but has not tendered such securities for conversion or ex-
change, or if he has an option or owns rights or warrants entitling him to such
security, but has not exercised them.
138 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (Supp. 1966).
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of the increase in the number of outstanding securities which re-
sults from his exercise. The solution to this anomalous situation
would be for the holder of the option to add the securities under-
lying his option to those then outstanding in computing his per-
centage ownership.
The foregoing discussion has concentrated on the beneficial
ownership of securities of the person receiving an option to buy.
It is necessary to also consider how granting the option affects the
beneficial ownership of the person on the other side of the transac-
tion. This situation provides still another example of how the
same securities may be beneficially owned by more than one per-
son. Where A, an officer beneficially owning twenty-four per
per cent of his issuer's securities gives B, who is neither an officer,
director nor stockholder of the company, the right to buy one-half
of his securities of the issuer, B's acquisition of the beneficial own-
ership of the underlying securities, which occurs upon the making
of the agreement, does not cause A to lose his beneficial ownership
of the securities at that time. Until the contract is performed, A
retains the benefits of ownership in those securities which enable
him to vote, and, since securities are fungible, to buy and sell them.
Consequently, A's beneficial ownership would be reduced from
twenty-four per cent to twelve per cent on the performance date,
not the date the contract was entered into, nor the date he received
B's notice of his intention to exercise. He would, however, have a
qualitative change in beneficial ownership on entering into the
contract with B.'
VIII. CONCLUSION
The hearings that preceded the adoption of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 revealed that a variety of unfair activities were
being perpetrated in the securities markets. To prevent these activi-
ties, Congress adopted in the act a combination of disclosure, anti-
fraud, antimanipulative, and regulatory requirements designed to
protect investors in the purchase and sale of securities. Because
of the frequency and efficiency with which insiders engaged in these
unfair activities, all of which were contrary to the fiduciary obliga-
tion they owed to their company's shareholders, Congress singled
them out for special treatment in section 16 of the act.
139 SEC Exchange Act Rule 16a-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-6 (rev. ed. 1964) requires
a reporting person to report the option as a change in beneficial ownership when the
contract is entered into.
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Subsections (b) and (c) of section 16 are designed with refer-
ence to two specific transactions of insiders - respectively, the
short-swing transaction made profitable through an unfair use of in-
side information, and the short-sale. Section 16(a) is more gen-
eral. By requiring disclosure of changes in beneficial ownership
it is designed (1) to expose to the broad glare of publicity transac-
tions which might be the subject of the general antifraud or anti-
manipulative provisions of the act, as well as the special provisions
of subsections (b) and (c), and (2) to reveal to the public in-
formation which could be used in an evaluation of the security.
The use of the term "beneficial ownership" has given rise to
notions that a person must have an equitable ownership interest
in securities to be a beneficial owner. But the Congress was not
concerned with the traditional concepts of property ownership -
concepts which developed in the context of settling adverse claims
to the same property. Such concepts are utterly foreign to the pur-
poses of section 16(a). Section 16(a) is concerned with resolv-
ing questions of adverse interests. But the adversity arises out of
the selfish interest of an insider which is incompatible with the
faithful discharge of the fiduciary obligation which he owes to the
outside shareholder. Application of the traditional concepts of
property law does nothing to prevent the breach of this fiduciary
obligation - the aim of section 16(a) and other provisions of the
Exchange Act. Accordingly, they cannot be used to determine the
scope of that remedial section. The words "beneficial ownership"
themselves, the purposes of section 16(a), and the legislative his-
tory of the Exchange Act make clear that beneficial ownership is
concerned with the benefits of ownership rather than the rights to
ownership. To conclude otherwise is to assume that an insider
must have equitable rights to effect inequitable acts.
To protect the outside shareholder from abuses, and to give
him an opportunity to evaluate market transactions directed by in-
siders, beneficial ownership must be interpreted to reach all those
securities which fall within these goals. Accordingly, "beneficial
ownership" must be interpreted to include all securities, as to which
the insider enjoys the benefits of ownership that give him either the
incentive or the ability to engage in transactions which may be in-
consistent with his fiduciary position - irrespective of any equitable
right in the securities. These benefits of ownership include the
pecuniary benefits which provide the incentive; the "use" benefits
of dealing with securities - that is, the power, legal or practical,
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to purchase, sell, or vote them - which provide the ability; and
the speculative benefits which allow him to profitably trade against
securities which he has the right to buy at a price certain. These
benefits may arise by reason of equitable ownership, or by reason
of contract, understanding, relationship, agreement, or other ar-
rangement.
The above test, which should be used to determine which secu-
rities must be reported by a person once he is subject to section
16(a), is more inclusive than the test which should be used to
determine which securities are beneficially owned in order to bring
a person within the insider provision of section 16(a) as a bene-
ficial owner of more than ten per cent of a class of registered equity
security. For this latter determination, the purpose of Congress to
subject to section 16 persons who have the opportunity to abuse
the advantages of an inside position must be considered. Accord-
ingly, "beneficial ownership" for this purpose should be interpreted
as including securities which enable a person to achieve the advan-
tages of an inside position, for example, the ability, legal or practi-
cal, to direct the voting of securities, or the right to acquire and
vote them.
The application of the foregoing tests of beneficial ownership
requires an examination of the facts in each situation to determine
whether a person does receive the benefits of ownership of securi-
ties which constitute him a beneficial owner for purposes of section
16. In some cases the answer is easy. In others, such as determin-
ing beneficial ownership of securities held by family members, it
is not. In an area, however, where certainty is so desirable, yet
flexibility so necessary, it is not easy to develop hard and fast rules
that will cover every situation.' 0 Until these rules are developed,
the purposes of section 16 and the Exchange Act as expressed in
the statute and the legislative history serve as the best guide for
determining the beneficial ownership of securities.
34 0 On the general problem of developing specific rles in securities regulation, see
Cohen & Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The Importance of Admin-
istrative Adjudication in Their Development, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 691 (1964).
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